Abstract. Existence and location of Nash equilibrium points are studied for a large class of a finite family of payoff functions whose domains are not necessarily convex in the usual sense. The geometric idea is to embed these non-convex domains into suitable Riemannian manifolds regaining certain geodesic convexity properties of them. By using recent non-smooth analysis on Riemannian manifolds and a variational inequality for acyclic sets, an efficient location result of Nash equilibrium points is given. Some examples show the applicability of our results.
Introduction and main result
Nash equilibrium plays a central role in game theory; it is a concept strategy of a game involving n-players (n ≥ 2) in which every player knows the equilibrium strategies of the other players, and by changing his/her own strategy alone, a player has nothing to gain.
Let K 1 , . . . , K n (n ≥ 2) be the non-empty sets of strategies of the players and f i : K 1 × . . . × K n → R (i ∈ {1, . . . , n}) be the payoff functions. A point p = (p 1 , . . . , p n ) ∈ K is a Nash equilibrium point for (f , K) if
. . , n}.
Here and in the sequel, the following notation are used: K = Π n i=1 K i ; p = (p 1 , . . . , p n ); (f , K) = (f 1 , . . . , f n ; K 1 , . . . , K n ); (p; q i ) = (p 1 , . . . , q i , . . . , p n ).
The most well-known existence result is due to Nash (see [12] , [13] ), which works for compact and convex subsets K i of Hausdorff topological vector spaces, and the continuous payoff functions f i are (quasi)convex in the i th -variable, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
A natural question that arises at this point is:
How is it possible to guarantee the existence of Nash equilibrium points for a family of payoff functions without any convexity or, even more, when their domains are not convex in the usual sense? Although many extensions and applications of Nash's result can be found (see, for instance, Chang [5] , Georgiev [6] , Kulpa and Szymanski [9] , Morgan and Scalzo [11] , Yu and Zhang [18] , and the references therein), to the best of our knowledge, only a few works can be found in the literature dealing with the above question. Nessah and Kerstens [14] characterize the existence of Nash equilibrium points on non-convex strategy sets via a modified diagonal transfer convexity notion, Tala and Marchi [16] also treat games with non-convex strategies reducing the problem to the convex case via a certain homeomorphism, and Kassay, Kolumbán and Páles [7] and Ziad [19] considered Nash equilibrium points on convex domains for non-convex payoff functions having suitable regularity instead of their convexity.
In the present paper we propose a new approach to answer the above question. Our idea is geometrical: we assume that the strategy sets K i (which are not convex in the usual sense) can be embedded into suitable Riemannain manifolds (M i , g i ) in a geodesic convex way (i.e., for any two points of K i there exists a unique geodesic in (M i , g i ) joining them which belongs entirely to K i ). Note that the choice of such Riemannian structures does not influence the Nash equilibrium points for (f , K). Moreover, after fixing these manifolds if the payoff functions 
n}. Then, there exists a Nash equilibrium point for (f , K).
Our further investigation is motivated by the following two questions:
• What about the case when some payoff functions f i are not convex on K i in spite of the geodesic convexity of
• Even for convex payoff functions f i on K i , how can we localize the Nash equilibrium points for (f , K)? The following concept is destined for simultaneously handling the above questions.
Let (M i , g i ) be complete finite-dimensional Riemannian manifolds; K i ⊂ M i be non-empty, geodesic convex sets; and
with D i open and geodesic convex, and K
for details, see Section 2. A similar notion on vector spaces has been introduced by Kassay, Kolumbán and Páles [7] .
A useful relation between Nash equilibrium points and Nash critical points is established by the following result.
Proposition 1.2. Any Nash equilibrium point for
. . , n}, the converse also holds.
In order to state our existence result concerning Nash critical points, we consider the hypothesis 
Therefore, g is convex if and only if −f Remark 2. Proposition 1.2 and Theorem 1.3 together give a possible answer to the location of Nash equilibrium points. Indeed, because of Theorem 1.3 we are able to find explicitly the Nash critical points for (f , K). Then, due to Proposition 1.2, among Nash critical points for (f , K) we may choose the Nash equilibrium points for (f , K).
Existence results of Nash equilibria are often derived from fixed point theorems, minimax/variational inequalities or KKM-type intersection theorems. In Section 2 we recall a Fan-type variational inequality proved by McClendon [10] concerning compact acyclic ANR sets, which is the main tool in the proof of Theorems 1.1 and 1.3. In order to prove Theorem 1.3, we also recall some basic elements from non-smooth analysis on Riemannian manifolds developed by Azagra, Ferrera and Lópes-Mesas [2] . In Section 3 we prove our results, while in Section 4 we give two applications which illustrate the applicability of the developed method.
Preliminaries
A non-empty set X is acyclic if it is connected and itsCech homology (coefficients in a fixed field) is zero in dimensions greater than zero. Note that every contractible set is acyclic (but the converse need not hold in general). The following result is the main tool in the proof of our existence results:
Theorem 2.1 ([10, Theorem 3.1]). Suppose that X is a compact acyclic finitedimensional ANR. Suppose h : X ×X → R is a function such that {(x, y) : h(y, y) > h(x, y)} is open and {x : h(y, y) > h(x, y)} is contractible or empty for all y ∈ X.
Then there is a y 0 ∈ X with h(y 0 , y 0 ) ≤ h(x, y 0 ) for all x ∈ X.
In the rest of this section, let (M, g) be a complete, finite-dimensional Riemannnian manifold. The following result is probably known, but since we have not found an explicit reference, we give its proof.
Proposition 2.2. Any geodesic convex set
Proof. Let us fix p ∈ K arbitrarily. Since K is geodesic convex, every point q ∈ K can be connected to p uniquely by the geodesic segment γ q :
is well-defined and continuous. Note actually that γ q (t) = exp p (t exp −1 p (q)). We define the map
It is clear that F is continuous, F (1, q) = q and F (0, q) = p for all q ∈ K; i.e., the identity map id K is homotopic to the constant map p. 
One can easily prove that the function f
see Claim 5.4 and the first relation on p. 341 of [2] .
Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1.
First of all, note that the sets K i are ANRs, due to Hanner's theorem; see Bessage and Pelczyński [3, Theorem 5.1] . Moreover, since a product of a finite family of ANRs is an ANR (see [3, Corollary 5.5] ), it follows that X is an ANR. Due to Proposition 2.2, X is contractible, thus acyclic.
Note that the function h is continuous and that h(p, p) = 0 for every p ∈ X. Consequently, the set {(q, p) ∈ X × X : 0 > h(q, p)} is open.
It remains to prove that S p = {q ∈ X : 0 > h(q, p)} is contractible or empty for all p ∈ X. Assume that S p = ∅ for some p ∈ X. Then, there exists i 0 ∈ {1, ..., n} such that (γ 1 (t), ..., γ n (t) ). Due to the convexity of the function We are in the position to apply Theorem 2.1. Therefore, there exists p ∈ K such that 0 = h(p, p) ≤ h(q, p) for every q ∈ K. In particular, putting q = (p; q i ),
, ..., n}; i.e., p is a Nash equilibrium point for (f , K).
Proof of Proposition 1.2. Let p ∈ K be a Nash equilibrium point for (f , K). In particular, for every q i ∈ K i with i ∈ {1, . . . , n} fixed, the geodesic segment t → exp p i (t exp p i (q i )) ≥ 0, which proves that p ∈ K is a Nash critical point for (f , K). Now, let us assume that p ∈ K is a Nash critical point for (f , K). Since D i q i → f i (p; q i ) is convex, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, due to (2.2), for every q i ∈ K i , we have The function
